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The Issue 
To  meet its commitment to the  Kyoto Protocol (KP),  Canada must reduce its current 
annual GHG emissions (694 MT CO2 equivalent) by 240 MT CO2. Canada’s agricultural 
industries have the potential to generate a carbon sink of 10 MT CO2 (Government of 
Canada, 2003). The purpose of this article is to consider the manner in which Canadian 
agricultural policy has responded to Canada’s KP commitment and the likelihood that 
Canadian agriculture will participate significantly in carbon emission trading.  
Implications and Conclusions 
Proposed  changes  to  agricultural  policy  are  fairly  small  and  focus  on  encouraging 
beneficial  management  practices  (BMPs)  and  verifying  carbon  sequestration  through 
computer models based on model farms. While agricultural carbon sinks may be included 
in a national GHG inventory, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether they will be 
traded in any significant degree in a carbon-offset market.  
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This  uncertainty  stems  from  the  basic  economics  of  carbon  sequestration.  First, 
carbon-offset prices are expected to remain low, in part because the significant reductions 
in GHG output that have occurred in Russia and other Eastern Block countries since 1990 
can be used to meet worldwide Kyoto reduction requirements, thus limiting demand for 
carbon reductions from other sources. Demand has also been reduced because of the U.S. 
withdrawal from the KP. In addition, the Canadian government has proposed a regulated 
cap of C$15.00 per tonne CO2 on carbon-offset prices, thus limiting any price increase in 
the first commitment period. Second, the costs of verification of carbon sequestration may 
be high. A key factor here is that the scientific link between BMPs and GHG reduction is 
still unclear. This uncertainty over the impact of BMPs is likely to result in a discounting 
of the GHG reduction and sequestration that can be claimed, which in turn raises the per 
unit cost. The low price and high verification costs may mean it is not profitable for 
farmers to participate in carbon-offset markets, especially when they must consider other 
issues such as production risk, off-farm income, liability issues and the option value of not 
being locked into providing permanent credits.  
Background and Policy Overview 
Canada  ratified  the  Kyoto  Protocol  (KP)  in  December  2002,  committing  itself  to  a 
national reduction of 129 MT CO2 equivalent per year during the 2008–2012 commitment 
period. Under the agreement, the national inventory of GHG emissions at Environment 
Canada  is  expected  to  be  in  place  by  March  2005.  This  inventory  will  account  for 
Canada’s  GHG reductions and sequestrations under  the  KP, and it  will keep track of 
carbon  credits  in  domestic  and  international  emission  trading  schemes.  Methane  and 
nitrous oxide emissions from enteric fermentation and methodologies for certification will 
be incorporated into the system at a later stage.  
For agriculture, the National Carbon and Greenhouse Gas Emission Accounting and 
Verification System for Agricultural Land will estimate the amounts and uncertainties of 
soil carbon stock changes and GHG emissions at the provincial, regional and national 
levels. The accounting system uses standard methodologies; it incorporates land use and 
management databases based on ecological models as well as temporal and spatial scaling 
processes (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2003c).  
Under the Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change, Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 
(AAFC) has been allotted $33 million over five years for programs to address agricultural 
emissions of GHGs. This funding includes $12 million to be divided amongst the Model 
Farm  Program  ($5  million),  the  Enhanced  Shelterbelts  Program  ($4  million)  and  the 
Biofuels  Program  ($3  million),  with  the  remaining  $21  million  allocated  to  the 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Program for Canadian Agriculture (henceforth referred to as 
the  GHG  Mitigation  Program).  The  GHG  Mitigation  Program  maintains  a  goal  of 
reducing agricultural GHG emissions by 5.8 MT per year CO2 equivalent during the first 
Kyoto commitment period (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2003a).  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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One objective of the GHG Mitigation Program is to identify beneficial management 
practices (BMPs) that can facilitate on-farm GHG emission reduction and enhance carbon 
sequestration through improvements to soil, nutrient and livestock management practices. 
Examples of BMPs include carrying out fertilizer formulation and application, livestock 
feeding, manure handling and soil management in ways that enhance carbon sequestration 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2003a). 
The identification of BMPs is critical to the creation of a viable measurement and 
verification system through the  Model Farm Program.  The  Model Farm Program is a 
separate program under the Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change and relies on teams of 
scientists from across the country to measure GHG emissions as a function of Canadian 
soil, crop and livestock management practices. Their measurements of greenhouse gas 
fluxes  become  incorporated  into  computer  models  that  are  then  used  to  estimate  net 
emissions from whole farms. A regional estimate is extrapolated from the resulting data. 
The reliability of model farms will be evaluated by further measurements at representative 
farms and research sites in regions across Canada (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 
2003d).  
A GHG mitigation advisory committee will identify, verify, and package the BMPs 
into “suites” that reduce on-farm GHG emissions and increase carbon sequestration. The 
program  will  use  demonstrations,  communications  and  training  sessions  to  encourage 
producers to adopt those BMPs that both reduce  GHG emissions and have economic 
benefits. The advisory committee membership will include research, producer, federal and 
provincial  government,  academic  and  industry  expertise  and  will  be  supported  by  a 
scientific working group comprised of four to five scientists from AAFC and a broader 
reference group of experts. AAFC is working with the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association, 
the  Canadian  Pork  Council,  the  Dairy  Farmers  of  Canada  and  the  Soil  Conservation 
Council of  Canada, all of  which have taken on the responsibility of raising producer 
awareness  regarding  GHG  mitigation  practices  (Agriculture  and  Agri-food  Canada, 
2004b). 
As  discussed  elsewhere  (Fulton  et  al.,  forthcoming),  farmers  have  an  economic 
incentive  to  adopt  BMPs  in  an  effort  to  conserve  water  and  soil  organic  matter  and 
thereby increase yields and economic returns. Thus, farmers can be expected to adopt 
BMPs when these practices provide direct economic benefits. In addition, farmers may 
have an incentive to adopt BMPs in order to participate in the carbon-offset market. The 
basic idea behind the carbon-offset market is that carbon emitters (e.g., large industrial 
energy users) who are required to reduce their carbon emissions may decide to purchase a 
carbon-offset (or carbon reduction) credit from a third party (e.g., agricultural producers) 
instead of investing in the technology to undertake the carbon reduction themselves (for 
information on how a carbon-offset market in Canada might function, see Government of 
Canada, 2003). Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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Providing that Canada elects to use agricultural sinks to meet a portion of its KP 
obligations, the BMPs undertaken by farmers – whether to earn direct economic benefits 
or to participate in the carbon market – will be entered into the national inventory and will 
be applied against Canada’s reduction commitments.
1 The federal inventory is designed to 
count all reductions and sequestration; while trades will be tracked, this will be done only 
to facilitate the working of Canada’s domestic trading system. The baseline date for the 
inclusion of GHG reduction projects or carbon sequestration projects that can be reported 
under the KP is 1990. Only carbon reductions/sequestration that take place in the 2008–
2012  commitment  period  and  are  associated  with  projects  started  after  this  date  are 
eligible to be counted. The baseline date for projects that can be included in the carbon-
trading scheme is 2002. Farmers that began projects after 1990 and before 2002, however, 
may be able to have their projects included in the carbon-offset market if they participate 
in a pool.  
Canadian Agriculture and the Carbon-offset Market 
Whether or not Canadian farmers will choose to participate in the carbon-offset market 
will depend on the profitability of such involvement. This profitability will depend on the 
price farmers can expect to receive for sequestered carbon, the costs of sequestering it and 
the  transaction  costs  of  participation.  If  the  expected  price  is  less  than  the  total  cost 
(sequestration plus transaction costs), it is not expected that farmers will participate in the 
carbon-offset market. 
Expected Price 
As a number of authors have argued (see, for example, Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002; 
Böhringer and Vogt, 2003; Springer, 2003), the expected price of carbon-offsets over the 
short term is likely to be low. As a consequence, the KP is unlikely to impose substantial 
compliance costs on the ratifying countries, including Canada. The low expected price is a 
direct result of the United States not being a signatory to the KP and of the large amount 
of  so-called  hot  air  that  is  available  from  the  Eastern  European  economies,  where 
emissions have fallen as a result of decreases in industrial production. 
Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) considered the global carbon-offset market (carbon-
offset is treated as a single commodity) after the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
and estimated a price of US$3.78 per tonne CO2. Their analysis reflects the modifications 
of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  negotiated  in  November  2001  and  known  as  the  Marrakech 
Accords. The Marrakech Accords accept carbon sinks as a means of carbon reduction 
within the Annex B countries. (Annex B countries are the 39 emissions-capped industrial-
ized countries and economies in transition listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.) In 
their analysis, Jotzo and Michaelowa assume that Annex B countries fully utilize their 
forest management sink caps for carbon reductions (the accords identify country-specific 
ceilings for forest sinks). In addition, they assume that Annex B countries commit on Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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average 10 percent of their agricultural soils to carbon sequestration. In total, sinks are 
assumed  to  make  up  on  average  14  percent  of  the  carbon  reduction  across  Annex  B 
countries, while hot air is found to account for 34 percent of total reduction.  
Böhringer and Vogt (2003) showed that the introduction of an international carbon-
offset market, the non-involvement of the United States in this market and the allowance 
of sinks all lead to significant reductions in the expected price of carbon. Their analysis 
also takes into account the impact of the hot air traded by countries of the former Soviet 
Union. They estimated a marginal abatement cost to the KP signatory countries – and 
hence an expected price – of US$5.48 per tonne CO2. A significant portion of this price 
arises because of the market power that the countries of the former Soviet Union are 
expected to exert when selling hot air. The authors concluded, as did Grubb et al. (2003), 
that the KP will not have a significant impact on the signatories in the first negotiation 
round. 
Springer (2003) presented a survey of numerous research studies that examine the 
impact of the KP. The models he surveyed showed a large variation in prices; with the 
involvement of the United States in an international carbon-offset market, carbon prices 
are estimated to be anywhere from US$1.10 to US$24.25 per tonne CO2, with a median 
price of US$8.82 per tonne CO2. If the United States is not included and Russia and the 
Ukraine are able to exert their monopoly power in the sale of hot air, the estimates are in 
the range of US$7.71 to US$8.82 per tonne CO2. 
Carbon Sequestration Costs 
The  principal  means  by  which  agriculture  is  likely  to  sequester  carbon  include 
conservation tillage, reductions in summer fallow, conversion of agricultural land into 
permanent grass cover, conversion of land into forests (afforestation) and agroforestry. 
Antle et al. (2001) estimated the marginal cost of sequestering carbon through continuous 
cropping and the conversion of farmland into permanent cover for dryland grain farmers 
in Montana to be in the range of US$3.27 to US$136.24 per tonne of CO2. Their estimate 
reflects regional characteristics of net carbon yield and opportunity costs and takes into 
account whether the payment scheme for sequestration is on a per acre or per tonne basis. 
Pautsch et al. (2001) estimated the marginal costs associated with the adoption of 
conservation  tillage  by  Iowa  farmers.  Their  cost  estimates  range  from  US$2.72  to 
US$190.74 per tonne CO2, depending on the form of payment the farmers receive. One 
million  tonnes  of  CO2  sequestration  could  be  achieved  with  a  carbon-offset  price  of 
US$51 per tonne CO2 if payment were based on per tonne sequestered; the cost would rise 
to US$73.57 per tonne CO2 if farmers were given a flat fee per acre to adopt no-till. 
The Canadian Economic and Emissions Model for Agriculture (CEEMA) predicted 
significant sequestration levels on the Canadian Prairies through a reduction in summer 
fallow  and  an  increase  in  conservation  tillage  at  average  carbon-offset  prices  around 
C$5.45 per tonne CO2 (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1999), while Weersink et al. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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(2003) found that a carbon-offset price greater than C$40 per tonne CO2 is required to 
induce a shift in either crop rotation or tillage system by Ontario farmers. 
Using  a  meta-analysis,  Manley  et  al.  (2004)  argued  that  the  cost  of  carbon 
sequestration on the Prairies is much higher than suggested in the studies cited above. 
They  found  that  the  cost  of  sequestering  carbon  at  a  depth  of  25  cm  using  no-till 
(compared to conventional tillage) is between US$40 and US$100 per tonne CO2. Manley 
et al. pointed out that while some carbon can be sequestered at virtually no cost, the cost is 
likely to increase rapidly as more carbon is sequestered. They also suggested that the best 
opportunities for carbon sequestration in soils would be found in the southern United 
States.  
A number of studies have been conducted to estimate the supply of carbon-offset 
through the conversion of agricultural land to forest plantations. In a review of these 
studies, Richards and Stokes (2004) estimated that a carbon-offset price of US$2.72 to 
US$40 per tonne CO2 could sequester 250–500 million tonnes of carbon annually in the 
United States and more than 2000 million tonnes globally. Canadian supply estimates 
from afforestation are within the range of values summarized by Richards and Stokes 
(2004). In a study published in 1992, van Kooten et al. estimated that for a carbon price 
between  C$2.00  and  C$6.25  per  tonne  CO2,  forest  plantations  and  better  forest 
management could annually sequester 22 and 48 million tonnes CO2 respectively. The 
estimated sink levels increase to 3670 million tonnes CO2 from afforestation in an updated 
study (van Kooten et al., 2000) for carbon prices up to $14 per tonne CO2. As McKenney 
et al. (2004) showed, the costs of sequestering carbon are very sensitive to the assumed 
growth rate of the forest. For growth rates less than 12 m
3/h•yr.
-1, only one percent of 
agricultural land in Canada would be converted to forest at a price of C$50 per tonne CO2. 
Transaction Costs 
The cost of sequestering carbon is only one of the costs that affects the likelihood farmers 
will participate in carbon-offset markets. Also important are the costs of undertaking the 
transaction to sell carbon credits as well as the costs of administering the system (Stavins, 
1995). The transaction costs include the resources required to evaluate and certify the 
carbon credits as well as any costs related to farmer resistance and/or associated with the 
mechanism  (e.g.,  contracts)  used  to  encourage  farmers  to  participate  in  carbon-offset 
markets (van Kooten, Shaikh and Suchánek, 2002). 
In a report prepared for AAFC, the transaction costs associated with evaluating and 
certifying the credits were estimated to be anywhere between 65 and 85 percent of the 
total costs (transaction costs plus administrative costs), with the total costs ranging from 
C$0.37 to nearly C$2.00 per tonne CO2 (Government of Canada, 2004).  These costs, 
however, have to be viewed as a lower bound to the total transaction and administrative 
costs  that  can  be  expected  to  exist.  For  example,  van  Kooten,  Shaikh  and  Suchánek 
showed that nearly 75 percent of farmers in the Western Canadian grain belt expressed a Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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willingness to create carbon sinks if they were adequately compensated, although a much 
smaller fraction indicated that they would actually be willing to move ahead with the 
required land use changes. Farmers were particularly unwilling to plant large blocks of 
trees, and van Kooten, Shaikh and Suchánek suggested that these results indicate that 
other factors besides the actual cost of sequestering carbon are at work in determining 
whether a farmer will participate in the carbon market. 
Other  issues  for  producers  considering  the  adoption  of  new  BMPs  will  include 
production risk, off-farm income, liability and the option value of not becoming locked 
into providing permanent credits. On this last point, Vercammen (2002) demonstrated that 
a farmer considering a carbon contract that requires indefinite carbon sequestration would 
need to be provided with an option value in order to make the contract profitable. This 
option value functions as a compensation, or premium, for the cost incurred by the farmer 
when an irreversible decision is made – by signing the contract, the farmer no longer has 
the option of making other decisions in the future. Vercammen showed that the premium 
required may be in the order of 60 to 70 percent – that is, the market price would have to 
be 60 to 70 percent greater than the farmer’s costs before the farmer would have sufficient 
incentive  to  agree  to  sequester  carbon.  In  addition  to  the  option  value,  farmers  may 
require a premium over their costs in order to cover off the risks they perceive they are 
taking on when they sign the contract. 
There are other factors that may raise the transaction costs associated with carbon 
sequestration. As outlined earlier in this article, Canada’s approach to GHG accounting 
relies  heavily  on  being  able  to  clearly  link  specific  management  practices  to  GHG 
reductions or carbon sequestration,  with aggregate emissions and carbon sequestration 
determined through the use of computer models associated with different soil, crop and 
livestock management practices as well as different farming systems. The output of these 
computer models, however, is only as good as the assumed relationships on which the 
models are based. Unfortunately, the causal links between specific practices and GHG 
reduction/carbon sequestration are not well understood in all cases.  
While certain management practices, such as minimum tillage of Prairie soils, clearly 
have the ability to sequester carbon (Desjardins et al., 2004), there is evidence that this 
linkage does not occur in all locations. In Ontario, for instance, the adoption of minimum 
tillage  does  not  appear  to  result  in  any  significant  carbon  sequestration.  As  well, 
uncertainty exists over the coefficients that should be used to convert particular practices 
into carbon sequestration amounts (Weersink et al., 2003). This uncertainty is very large 
for N2O, where very little is known about the connection between management practices 
and emissions.  
Given  of  this  uncertainty,  more  scientific  research  is  required  in  order  for  the 
relationships  between  BMPs  and  GHG  reduction  and  carbon  sequestration  to  be 
understood. For example, almost no research has been performed on what can be called Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
 
 
      8 
the “landscape scale”, an area  encompassing roughly a dozen farms (Weersink  et al., 
2003).  
If the scientific links between particular management practices and levels of carbon 
sequestration are uncertain, there will be a discounting of the carbon that can be claimed 
as having been sequestered. This discounting occurs because of the need for assurance. 
The larger the degree of uncertainty associated with the amount that is claimed, the more 
it will be necessary to either sequester a greater amount of carbon or undertake costly 
monitoring and verification in order to have assurance that a specific amount of carbon is 
actually sequestered. Discounting thus raises the cost associated with providing carbon-
offsets; in short, the discounting of carbon sequestration rates is a transaction cost, since 
an important component of transaction costs is the  monitoring and verification of the 
amount of carbon that has been sequestered.  
These monitoring and verification costs are likely to be important. As the study done 
for AAFC showed, transaction costs are estimated to be as high as C$18.56 per tonne CO2 
when the  monitoring and verification of individual  projects is required.  When project 
pooling is allowed, the cost drops to between C$0.10 and $0.20 per tonne CO2. However, 
these cost savings can only be achieved if monitoring is kept to a minimum and if certain 
management practices can be linked to clearly defined amounts of carbon sequestration. If 
the links between certain  management practices (e.g., the  BMPs) and greenhouse gas 
reduction and/or carbon sequestration are not clear, it will not be possible to inexpensively 
verify that reductions have occurred, and other more costly forms of verification will have 
to be used. 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Although agricultural sinks can potentially be included in a carbon-offset trading system, 
there is considerable uncertainty over whether this will occur. This uncertainty is a result 
of the underlying economics of the carbon market and of carbon sequestration. While 
there is some variation in the estimates of the expected price that is likely to exist in the 
carbon-offset market once the KP takes effect, there is some consensus that the price will 
be relatively low – e.g., somewhere in the range of US$4.00 to US$5.00 per tonne CO2. 
This price would provide sufficient incentive to sequester some carbon in soils, since the 
marginal cost of the first units of carbon to be sequestered is likely to be close to zero. As 
the  amount  of  carbon  sequestered  rises,  the  marginal  cost  of  sequestration  also  rises. 
Depending on the costs of monitoring and verification, and the option values and risk 
premiums  that  farmers  require,  it  is  unlikely  that  prices  in  the  range  of  US$4.00  to 
US$5.00  per  tonne  CO2  will  provide  sufficient  incentive  for  farmers  in  Canada  to 
sequester carbon on any significant scale.  
Given the anticipated prices and costs, there is a strong likelihood that farmers will 
not be able to participate individually in the carbon-offset market – the costs associated 
with monitoring and verification are simply too high. There is, however, some potential Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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for  farmers  to  participate  in  the  carbon-offset  market  through  pools,  providing  the 
monitoring and verification costs can be kept low by linking the BMPs undertaken by 
farmers in the pool with reductions in GHG emissions or the sequestration of carbon.  
If carbon sequestration occurs through pooling, it is likely to be on the Prairies, where 
the link between carbon sequestration and particular management practices such as no till 
is relatively well established (although evidence was presented above that this linkage 
may not be as strong as has been suggested). The much weaker link that exists between 
BMPs and carbon sequestration in other parts of the country, and between BMPs and 
GHG emission reductions in virtually all agricultural regions and sectors, means that the 
monitoring and verification costs for these activities are likely to be substantial, which in 
turn suggests that they will not be part of the carbon-offset trading system. 
Although  the  cost  of  carbon  sequestration  may  be  lower  in  activities  such  as 
afforestation, there is some evidence that farmers are reluctant to make the investment in 
what is a relatively unknown practice. The risk premium and the option values required by 
farmers in these situations are likely to be too large to entice a large-scale change in land 
use in this direction. 
This reluctance may be even greater given the carbon price cap that exists in Canada 
for the 2008–2012 period. In response to concerns on the part of the large final emitters 
(LFEs), the Canadian federal government has made a commitment that LFEs will pay no 
more than C$15.00 per tonne of CO2 (Christoffersen, 2003). In addition to the risks the 
cap introduces for the government and the incentives it creates for speculative trades, the 
cap reduces the expected profitability of carbon sequestration activities by farmers.  
If Canada succeeds in having agriculture participate in the carbon-offset market, it 
will be relatively unique among countries in the world. Australian soil has low potential 
for carbon sequestration activities in agriculture and therefore provides little demand and 
supply. In the European  Union,  agricultural sinks are not eligible for inclusion in the 
emissions trading scheme. The United States continues to prefer agricultural policies that 
are designed to support farm income and meet other environmental objectives, such as the 
Environmental  Quality  Incentive  Program  and  the  Conservation  Reserve  Program. 
Nonetheless, a few carbon-offset market transactions involving soil-sequestered carbon 
have occurred.  
Based  on  the  analysis  above,  the  most  likely  scenario  is  that  during  the  first 
commitment period, from 2008–2012, Canadian farmers will participate only to a small 
extent  in  the  carbon-offset  market.  Nevertheless,  farmers  will  find  it  advantageous  to 
adopt  many  of  the  BMPs  discussed  above,  since  these  will  generate  direct  economic 
benefits in terms of, for example, better water use or the creation of higher quality soil. 
These BMPs will be counted as part of Canada’s inventory of GHG reductions and carbon 
sequestration.  Thus,  while agriculture  may not participate in the carbon-offset trading 
system in as significant a fashion as was once anticipated, agriculture will nevertheless 
make a contribution to meeting Canada’s KP commitments.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Fulton, M. Cule and A. Weersink 
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Endnote 
1 Canada must decide by late 2006 if it wishes to use soil sinks and/or forest sinks as part 
of its GHG inventory. If either of these options is incorporated, all related changes in 
carbon  sequestration  (positive  or  negative)  will  have  to  be  included  in  Canada’s 
accounting system (Government of Canada, 2003). 